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FOUR LESSONS THAT THE U.S. NAVY MUST LEARN
FROM THE DREADNOUGHT REVOLUTION
Angus K. Ross
There is only one thing harder than getting an old idea out of a military
mind, and that is to get a new one in.
SIR BASIL H. LIDDELL HART
Four years ago, on 14 June 2006, at a Current Strategy Forum held at the Na-val War College, the then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Mi-
chael Mullen, challenged the audience to think about a new strategy for the U.S.
Navy.1 Recalling the enthusiasm and fresh thinking that had surrounded the de-
velopment of the World War II ORANGE plans against Japan and a later, Cold
War, naval strategy, he urged that the time was ripe to take an equally fundamen-
tal look at the needs and constraints of the modern age and to codify a possible
maritime contribution to emerging national objectives. Early work in this direc-
tion has produced the joint Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard document “A Co-
operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (hereafter CS-21), which was
released in October 2007.2 It is fair to say that the paper has had mixed reviews,
and it is not the author’s intent here to add anything to that debate. Instead, it is
hoped that this article—by taking the “Cooperative
Strategy” simply as a broad statement of how sea
power might be used in the next twenty years or so to
defend the nation’s global interests and noting that
any discussion of forces and force structure had been
explicitly discouraged in its formulation—might help
stimulate the next stage of the inquiry.3 This stage will
need to address the tough questions of how, if at all,
the U.S. Navy needs to adjust its “institutional fabric”
in order to embody the principles contained in the
document. Put simply: Will the essence of American
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sea power, as we have come to know it, need to change, and if so, how? It is also
important to appreciate at this stage that the Navy’s institutional fabric, while it
certainly contains force structure, is much more than mere platforms and capa-
bilities. The way the Navy sees itself within the global context, the missions it
sees as important, how it educates and develops its manpower, and even how it
goes about convincing other institutions of its worth all will need patient reflec-
tion before the process can be called complete.
As a way of getting started, however, it might be instructive to look at how
others have responded to previous times of great change in history—if only to
see in advance some of the pitfalls. Since a general consensus has us moving to-
day from an “industrial” to an “information” age, an obvious place to look might
be the equivalent “watershed” era, the onset of the industrial age in the late nine-
teenth century. The aim should be to look for broad parallels: to see if there is
anything that we can learn from their experiences that might better inform the
modern debate and help us to avoid mistakes like those made at that time. There
should be nothing prescriptive in this, since every time period has its own
unique, prevailing set of personalities, politics, and geostrategic circumstances
that, to a large extent, dictates the scope and scale of the possible responses. That
said, there are certain recurring problems in these processes, the study of which
can definitely improve our overall understanding of the dynamics at work. Fi-
nally, while the ultimate need for a joint approach is accepted, one of the key
functions of service thinking is to look at problems from the perspectives of in-
dividual services and environments, so as to ensure that their own, unique con-
tributions are identified and that joint provisions can be made accordingly.
There is therefore value in defining a possible naval contribution at an early
stage. This work therefore focuses exclusively on strategic thought as it pertains
to possible naval operations.
Specifically, this article will look for parallels with the case of the Edwardian
Royal Navy under Admiral Sir John “Jackie” Fisher in the 1904–1908 time frame
(figure 1).4 This is a period and service that inevitably commands attention from
modern American strategists. Although similar technological and strategic
pressures were being felt all over the world, here was a naval power that had long
enjoyed a position of maritime primacy; had a well established, tried, and tested
maritime strategy for dealing with the global commons; and yet was facing a
combination of fiscal and technological changes that threatened its traditional
way of fielding and using its power. In short, with the twin prospects of a slowing
economy and a massively increasing imperial defense budget, Great Britain was
facing a need to make economies in its naval spending while at the same time
confronting huge new challenges as the world’s premier sea power.
1 2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWCR_Autumn2010-Ross.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Thursday, August 19, 2010 1:28:06 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 4, Art. 12
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/12
Although reasoned strategic exposés were rare in the late Victorian era, the
Royal Navy’s long-standing approach to its responsibilities prior to Fisher’s ar-
rival can best be summarized as follows. The most fundamental naval role was of
course the defense of the home islands against an invasion from Europe. This
was to be entrusted to a fleet of battleships based in the English Channel, al-
though it could be reinforced if necessary from the other powerful battleship
fleet in the Mediterranean or the reserve fleet, as appropriate. For Britain, there-
fore, battleship primacy was of the utmost import, and the nation went to great
lengths to maintain a superiority in these platforms such that “it should at least
be equal to the naval strength of any two other countries.”5 This “two-power
standard,” as it became known, meant in practice that the bulk of the resources
allocated to the Royal Navy were channeled into battleship building, particularly
when facing the very real threat of the combined fleets of France and Russia. Un-
fortunately, it also meant that naval strategy and the procurement of battleships
became somewhat synonymous, particularly with politicians, with the overall
detriment of the quality of naval strategic thought.
Equally, it is important to appreciate that the battleship building policy was
also inextricably linked to Great Britain’s overwhelming superiority in ship
building. Britain was one of the first powers to industrialize, and having a clear
need for overseas trade, its shipbuilding and shipping lines had taken an enor-
mous lead over the rest of the world, such that by the late nineteenth century
British-built or -owned ships accounted for some 80–90 percent of oceanic
trade. Obviously the infrastructure generated to produce such a large fleet
amounted to so massive a latent capacity in shipbuilding that it was possible for
the British to produce complex warships more cheaply overall and far more
quickly than anyone else. This advantage meant that a part of the late Victorian
naval policy was the deliberate encouragement of batch building and conserva-
tism in design—the theory being that should an opponent develop an innova-
tion of interest, the Royal Navy, provided it could analyze the merits of the
advance in time, was well placed to respond appropriately and field its own ver-
sions of the improvement at a quicker pace than the nation that had originally
conceived the idea.
The development of empire in the second half of the nineteenth century,
however, caused some difficulties with this policy, and it is true to say in general
that the navy failed to keep pace. In particular, the defense of the overseas pos-
sessions themselves and the considerable commerce that ran between them were
two areas that became increasingly important as secondary naval missions and
yet were ill matched with this battleship preponderance. In fact, and as John
Beeler has described, prior to the advent of the Royal Sovereign class in the 1890s,
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a true oceangoing capital ship was simply not feasible from a technological point
of view, even assuming that sufficient funds were available.6 This dilemma led to
an additional need for whole classes of “cruising ironclads”(or “cruisers,”as they
became known), an essentially new type but one whose speed and endurance
produced a demand for it also as a scouting vessel for the battle fleet. Though
these vessels were considerably cheaper at the outset than capital ships, they
were destined to grow in complexity and size as their utility became evident. It
should also be remembered that these classes were “over and above” the contin-
uing need to meet the “two-power” obligations in battleships.
As a result of these fiscal pressures, there was a natural tendency to use the
older, less sophisticated classes of cruisers on the imperial beat as “station”cruisers
—following the rationale that a cruiser that was obsolescent for a scouting com-
mission in a fleet pitted against first-class European opposition could still serve
with credit abroad, where the likelihood of its encountering sophisticated oppo-
nents was considerably reduced. For a while this policy worked well, but with the
advent of faster, long-range, armored cruisers developed by France specifically
for distant-waters operations in the 1890s, the days of a ship living out its twi-
light years in glorious isolation abroad looked to be numbered. Unfortunately
too, by this time the massive growth of the imperial responsibilities had led to
many scores of these vessels being so employed; the prospect of replacing all
these types in short order with first-rate, armored cruisers was a daunting one. It
was this development more than any other that led to an increased financial
draw on the naval budget and all the attendant scrutiny that this involved.
A recent analytical brief highlights this period as one in which the world was
policed by an “undisputed global navy” (that of Great Britain) but offers little
insight into how the Royal Navy actively attempted to offset these fiscal chal-
lenges by novel strategic thought.7 Worse still, by simply inferring that the Brit-
ish government “chose to limit its foreign and security policies to meet the
German threat” it drastically oversimplifies the extensive debate that raged at the
time and so risks dismissing useful lessons that might be learned from this ex-
ample. In part, therefore, that work, among others, has provided inspiration to
look at this period more closely.
{LINE-SPACE}
While the need for savings was always an integral part of Fisher’s plan, it is vital
to recognize that for him the main objective was always the continuance of Great
Britain’s primacy as a maritime power. A fervent navalist with a strong sense of
patriotic duty, he differed from most of his naval colleagues in that he had real-
ized early on that the economies being demanded were necessary for the nation’s
continuing health.8 In short, if maritime primacy were to be preserved, the only
responsible way forward for the navy was to accommodate these savings by
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adopting a radically different vision
of future naval warfare—a vision he
believed that advances in technol-
ogy were on the verge of delivering.
Specifically, Fisher worried about
the continuing soundness of each of
the three main naval missions men-
tioned above. The “anti-invasion”
battle fleet looked to be increasingly
threatened in coastal waters by the
torpedo, while the station cruiser
and commerce protector abroad
were similarly under threat from the
sheer speed and reactivity of the
modern armored cruiser squadrons
then under development by France
and Russia. Worse still, however, was
the manpower situation. In essence,
and because of the growth in the
numbers of these older cruisers
scattered around the world, a large
percentage of the navy’s available
manpower was committed abroad
on stations where it could learn little
about the techniques and drills asso-
ciated with modern warfare, or any-
thing of fleet maneuvers. To Fisher
this was an unforgivable waste in an
era where naval warfare was increas-
ingly characterized by extreme suddenness.9 He believed that the Royal Navy
simply could not afford to keep such a high percentage of its human capital es-
sentially “untrained” in the art of modern naval warfare; besides, he needed
these men at home in order to man the revolutionary new fleet he was about to
develop.
As a result of these concerns, Fisher set to work on a truly comprehensive re-
form program that sought to prepare the Royal Navy for the new era. Underpin-
ning these reforms was the idea that Great Britain could no longer afford, nor
was it necessarily tactically sound, to provide a dedicated platform type for each
of these three naval missions. The available speed and endurance of modern
ships was opening the door to more general-purpose types. Furthermore, by the
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Admiral Sir John “Jackie” Fisher
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judicious use of the new
technology and better
training, he believed, it
was possible to change
radically the way in which
these missions were ad-
dressed and still provide
the savings demanded by
the Treasury. Although
space does not permit a
full discussion of these
interdependent reforms,
the most pertinent here
was a revolutionary new
naval strategy centered
around the twin technol-
ogies of the submarine and the “battle cruiser” (such as HMS Invincible, pic-
tured in figure 2), a fast and lightly armored capital ship with a huge offensive
punch, designed specifically for the global needs of imperial defense.10 It was on
these battle cruisers that the offensive part of Fisher’s strategy depended: in
short, if these vessels could be made fast enough to react in a timely fashion to
events abroad and powerful enough to prevail against all modern vessels over-
seas, it should be possible to recall and replace all the station cruisers (and a sig-
nificant amount of the battle fleet) with “reactive” squadrons of naval power
projection and garner all the efficiency savings as a result.
Sadly for Fisher, and although he was successful with a great many of the ad-
ministrative parts of his reform package, a combination of unforeseen circum-
stances and pressures ultimately prevented him from radically changing the
strategic ethos of the Royal Navy, or at least within a strategically useful
timescale. As a result, many of the technologies and platforms being developed
for his purposes seemed strangely out of place once they appeared. The inevita-
ble consequence was that they were misemployed by a staunchly traditional Ad-
miralty, unwilling to accept the need for change. Perhaps the most obvious
victims were the battle cruisers, which, instead of heading up fast “flying squad-
rons” of global commerce protectors as Fisher had intended, were relegated to
the traditional battle fleet, organized as a fast division with the mission of hold-
ing contact with a fleeing enemy.11 This role, which ignored their intended stra-
tegic rationale and constrained them to lower speeds, made them acutely
vulnerable to the better-protected battleships, and the results, in retrospect,
should have been obvious. Paradoxically, though, Dreadnought (figure 3),
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FIGURE 2
HMS Invincible, 1909
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Fisher’s first revolutionary platform, designed to showcase some of the very
technology that would—in his mind, anyhow—put the battle-fleet idea out of
business, went on to thrive as a type.12 Whole classes of “dreadnoughts,” as they
came to be known, were built by most of the leading naval powers of the day, de-
spite the fact that the traditional battle line, as a strategic tool, was increasingly
suspect, both in scope and substance. {FIG 3A OR 3B ABOUT HERE}
The reasons why Fisher’s radical new naval strategy failed to catch on make il-
luminating reading for today’s would-be reformers. While some of the techno-
logical circumstances are clearly unique to that age, many of the broader
strategic and institutional pressures have parallels in all time periods, and our
recognition and understanding of them can therefore help us to prevent their
worst effects in the future. Specifically, the issues of excessive reliance on tech-
nology, the need for strategic flexibility, the need for full and comprehensive dia-
logue, the danger of “lazy” assumptions, and the problems of personalities and
distractions—all played parts in the failure of Fisher’s strategic revolution, and
all remain salutary lessons as relevant today as ever. The very fact, however, that
this revolution was attempted by the world’s
premier navy in order to maintain its posi-
tion of maritime primacy makes it an essen-
tial reference point for those intent on
similarly preserving the maritime primacy of
the United States a century later. It is, after
all, arguable that by not accepting the need
for an innovative approach, Great Britain
overstretched itself financially in attempting
to apply time-honored solutions to an alto-
gether more taxing, industrial-age naval sce-
nario. As a result, the British were to be poorly
placed to recover from the shock of the world
wars, and their loss of naval primacy was vir-
tually assured.
THE FISHER REVOLUTION, IN A NUTSHELL
Any brief résumé of the main points of the Fisher revolution and how they have
been interpreted by the historians must begin with the work of Arthur J. Marder.
A historian with a diplomatic background, Marder approached British naval
policy from the assumption that the larger, grand strategic premises had already
been established beyond reasonable doubt. His landmark, five-volume treatise
on the Fisher years (1961) has a single big theme, a theme that can be summa-
rized as follows.13 Prior to the arrival of Fisher as First Sea Lord, Marder argues,
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FIGURE 3
HMS Dreadnought, Photographed in 1906
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the Royal Navy was in the doldrums. Overwhelmed by the pace of technological
change and lacking any cohesive strategic direction as the Russian and French
naval situations changed (as we shall see), British naval policy wavered. Fisher,
with an eye toward an expansionist Germany, managed in short order to reform
the navy comprehensively and drag it into the industrial age in time to meet the
challenge. The main vehicle in his modernization program was Dreadnought, a
battleship of a design that embodied his twin ideals of speed and hitting power
and that he felt Britain’s superior shipbuilding resources could produce more
quickly and cheaply than could any other nation’s. Marder’s key assumption is
that Germany had already been identified as the main imperial threat to be
countered. Thus in his view, the containing of its emerging battle fleet was what
dictated the course of Royal Naval policy and gave Fisher’s reforms, including
Dreadnought, their true meaning.
Comprehensive though Marder’s treatment is, certain aspects of contempo-
rary documents hint at a different interpretation. Chief among these was the
disquieting fact that Fisher, in both private and official correspondence, seemed
to indicate that the role of the battleship as the sole arbiter of naval power was
becoming questionable on a number of counts. For one, he cited the increasing
range of the Whitehead torpedo and the consequence that the whole concept of
operating heavy ships off an enemy coast in waters infested with torpedo craft
and submarines was becoming unacceptably risky.14 When the only way to
threaten a battleship had been with a more powerful exemplar of the same type,
battleship primacy had made sense, but to Fisher’s way of thinking, those days
were now long past. The advent of fast torpedo craft and the long-range torpedo
had effectively put the proud battle fleet within the killing reach of even small
navies on limited budgets, leaving its rationale problematic.15 Fisher therefore
looked for what we would call today a “capabilities based” appraisal: a hard look
at the fundamental necessities of the sea fight and how these might best be
provided—perhaps by the adoption of a completely different set of plat-
forms. For Fisher, of course, the two essentials in any sea fight were speed and
hitting power.16
More recent scholarship has asked questions that Marder did not address. Jon
Sumida, in a crucial analysis of the impact of finance and technology on British
naval policy (1989), makes the case that it was the impending fiscal crisis that
Great Britain faced in the early years of the last century and the consequent lim-
its on naval spending that pointed to a radical rethinking of how the naval mis-
sion should be resourced.17 In short, it had become impossible to continue the
construction of up-to-date warships in the numbers and varieties required to
protect all of Britain’s maritime interests. The choice was therefore simple: ei-
ther the Royal Navy would have to drop some commitments, prioritizing its
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efforts, or else it would have to look for imaginative ways of doing more with
less. This impending crisis was perhaps most ably summarized by Lord
Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty: “They [the Sea Lords] must cease to
say ‘This is the ideal plan; How can we get enough money to carry it out?’ They
must say instead ‘Here is a sovereign; How much can we squeeze out of it that
will really count for victory in a naval war?’”18
At about the same time, the parallel development of the submarine has been
taken up by Nicholas Lambert, who in a series of articles and a book (1999) has
provided another of the connections that make Fisher’s intended strategy hang
together.19 In doing so, he convincingly explores the strategic problems facing
Fisher. What sort of fleet was necessary to defend all of Britain’s maritime inter-
ests in this changed era, and how might this best be provided for on a declining
budget? Lambert concludes that Britain had three main imperatives—to defend
the homeland, to protect the empire, and finally to safeguard the vast network of
interconnected global trade routes. As explained earlier, Fisher realized that the
conventional approach to these needs—that of employing three specialist plat-
forms, the battleship, the “station cruiser,” and the armored cruiser—was no
longer affordable or even tactically sound. The battle fleet was becoming in-
creasingly vulnerable to the torpedo in the shallow waters around the homeland,
while the speed and range of modern heavy warships meant that less-capable
cruisers scattered on stations around the world on basically diplomatic duties
were increasingly at risk. These vessels were neither strong enough to fight nor
fast enough to run away from the fast squadrons of armored cruisers that could
now threaten them.20
Fisher’s solution was elegant and simple, and it played to the new naval
strengths of the day. If submarines and torpedoes were making the shallow seas
unacceptably risky for the battle fleet, then Britain should move its battle fleet
out of harm’s way and rely on the same, new technologies to pose an equivalent
threat to any potential invader. In essence, the coastline of Great Britain was to
be entrusted to a sea-denial flotilla of torpedo craft, but mainly submarines.
Similarly, if the sheer mobility of modern steamships was threatening the station
cruiser on the empire “beat,” the answer was to develop faster, more powerful ar-
mored cruisers that could respond, in squadron strength and quickly, to events
in vital regions. The key here lay in utilizing the enormous advantages possessed
by Britain on account of its many key possessions overseas, something that sepa-
rated it from all competitors. If based at what he called the “five keys that lock up
the world” (the imperial fortresses of Gibraltar, Singapore, Alexandria, Dover,
and the Cape of Good Hope), Fisher reasoned, squadrons of these new battle
cruisers would provide all the necessary naval strength that Britain might re-
quire on a regional basis.21
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In this way, and because of the improved reaction times and combat power
embodied within the battle cruisers, Fisher further deduced that the navy could
do away with all the numerous station cruisers altogether—in effect, consolidat-
ing its naval power into a few squadrons of fast, powerful ships. Basically, the
Mahanian idea of concentration at the center in a fleet of powerful battleships
was being flipped onto its head. In Fisher’s plan the sea-denial strategy protected
the center, releasing large capital ships for a more active defense of the vulnera-
ble periphery and the vital trade routes across the global commons.22 In other
words, naval concentration was still achieved not at the center but on the periph-
ery, which, in Fisher’s view, made more sense for an industrial nation that was
uniquely dependent on an import economy. In so doing, two new platforms,
submarines and (what Fisher originally called) “super” cruisers, would have to
be developed and perfected to replace the three traditional types that had per-
formed these missions. The great selling point was, of course, savings; subma-
rines were considerably cheaper than heavy ships, and the “super” cruisers,
though expected to be expensive, particularly in manpower, were effectively to
replace all varieties of cruisers and battleships as well.
Fisher’s own clarity of purpose notwithstanding, it is nevertheless inescap-
able that Great Britain did not radically alter its naval strategy, or at least not
within a timescale that would have given such a shift real strategic value.23 In-
stead, it plunged headlong into yet another round of battleship escalation, while
at the same time attempting to maintain parity across the board in all classes of
naval vessels. The results were predictable, and financial exhaustion was averted
only by the onset of a European war and the consequent readjustment of na-
tional priorities. In this light, it is unfortunate that naval historians have tended
to analyze this period in terms of the merits or otherwise of a supposed “dread-
nought revolution” and not, as might arguably have been more correct, as the af-
termath of a failed “battle cruiser revolution.”24 It is argued here that only by
looking at it from this latter perspective will the correct institutional lessons on
handling change be drawn. So what exactly went wrong, and why?
TECHNOLOGY, TIMING, AND THE PROBLEMS OF STRATEGIC
UNCERTAINTY
Given the problems encountered with the battle cruiser’s fire-control system ac-
curacy at long range, it is tempting to conclude that this was just another in the
long line of instances where technological promises came to naught, thus leav-
ing a strategy without its necessary enabler. While there are certainly aspects of
this in the Fisher story, it would be a gross oversimplification if accepted without
regard to the changing strategic situation. After all, the British were certainly in-
novating at the time, producing revolutionary advances in gunnery,
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submarines, and propulsion, and all with remarkable rapidity. Second, British
industry was doing a commendable job of actually delivering these technologies,
as workable weapons systems and in time to make a difference strategically—or
at least, it was doing a better job than the competition, which is, after all, the cru-
cial point here. It would therefore be not only wrong but misleading simply to
dismiss these successes as irrelevant. Far more important to our understanding
of the dynamics involved, though, are the reactions of policy makers in the Ad-
miralty to these technological promises. Did they, in fact, pose the right strategic
questions in order to make the best possible use of what was likely and realistic
in the near term?
Using a related case, Erik Dahl, writing in these pages, examined whether the
controversies surrounding the French “Jeune École” movement of the late 1800s
might hold any lessons for a transforming American military today, and specifi-
cally for the proponents of network-centric warfare (NCW), which seems to
have been the main naval contribution to the transformation arguments thus
far.25 This is a useful and convenient starting point for the type of debate being
advanced here, although by simply concluding that the Jeune École was “ahead
of its time technologically” and that its proponents were guilty of “misjudging
the pace of change in naval warfare,” Dahl may have missed an opportunity. Spe-
cifically, he seems to have overlooked the most fundamental and important les-
son that can be drawn from the whole Jeune École experience—that in times of
great political and strategic uncertainty, such as we again face today, it does not
pay to develop a navy with too narrow a strategic focus or too specialized a mis-
sion set. After all, the only irrefutable historical consequence of this whole event,
as Dahl recognizes, was surely that the French, in their intermittent pursuit of a
specialized form of warfare against a single opponent (Great Britain), failed to
foresee that were the grand-strategic situation to change, their innovative fleet
was likely to be rendered strategically irrelevant and their nascent military-
industrial complex would have insufficient time to adjust.26 In effect there-
fore, they were not asking the right strategic questions in the appropriate global
context. This is essentially what caused the French navy to flounder for forty
years and France to lose its position as a leading naval power.
To some extent, but with one important exception, Fisher’s battle-cruiser
idea suffered from a similar strategic “overspecialization,” and once again this
was revealed by an unanticipated strategic shift. In the three decades prior to
these ships’ conception, both the French and the Russians, whose navies had
been hopelessly outclassed by the British battle fleet and who lacked the re-
sources to compete in this realm, had made a considerable effort to challenge
Great Britain instead by preparing for commerce raiding on the global com-
mons. Here they had correctly assessed that their enemy would be much weaker.
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By building a whole series of fast commerce destroyers, these powers, whether
acting alone or in an alliance together, had posed a threat that was to give the
battleship-centric British considerable headaches.27 Great Britain’s early answer
had been simply to outbuild these two powers in similar armored cruisers, and it
was this program, on top of the maintenance of a superior battle fleet, that had
led to the fiscal crisis so ably described by Sumida. However, by 1905 France was
becoming increasingly aligned with Britain, in fear of the rising Germany, and
Russia was temporarily out of the naval picture, having suffered devastating
losses in the Far East. This left only Germany, and lacking the necessary global
infrastructure of bases, it was in no position to threaten Britain’s global com-
merce in the way that France and Russia once had, although it unquestionably
had the technology. In fact there is considerable evidence that the German naval
strategists had long before discounted a naval war against British trade.28 Regret-
tably for Fisher, however, this all happened too quickly for the naval procure-
ment cycle.
The truly unfortunate part of this story is that notwithstanding the merits of
the strategic thinking that had underwritten their development, by the time
Fisher’s battle cruisers actually emerged some four years later, these quirks in in-
ternational politics had made them seem strangely irrelevant. Naval affairs were
once again, if perhaps artificially, dominated by an enhanced version of an alto-
gether more familiar brand of naval power—the dreadnought battleship. Could
or should this reversion have been foreseen? The answer would seem to be quali-
fied: yes and no. Yes—the British had taken a calculated risk that the future
would, as envisioned, require a more proactive role for their navy on the global
commons. In developing a more specialist capability to that end they had es-
chewed their tried and tested policy of letting the others do the innovating while
trusting in their markedly superior shipbuilding abilities to mount an appropri-
ate response within the requisite time frame.29 Even at the time, there were many
who believed that this was the wrong strategic choice.30
But, with due deference to their lordships, and going back to the exception
mentioned earlier: no—Great Britain was different. It was the premier maritime
power of its day, and thus the traditional “wait and see” approach might not have
been the best one under the circumstances. The French, who were attempting to
compete from a position of naval inferiority, had to always respond, to a certain
extent, to whatever stance the more powerful navies took, but the British had no
such encumbrance. They were uniquely free to make naval strategic choices, se-
cure in the knowledge that whatever steps they took, they could invariably drive
their competitors into areas that were even less advantageous to them. This, after
all, is one of the advantages of supreme military power: it gives you strategic
choices and allows you to select those that cause the maximum disruption for
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your rival. The British therefore, facing as they were a whole series of difficulties
related to the uncertainties of the era, may in fact have erred by not relying on
this hard-won strategic safety net more thoroughly. Arguably it was time for
them to maximize their innovation, while they still stood a chance of finding a
more durable way to retain their primacy.
Perhaps the one concrete mistake that they did make, however, was to provide
a skeptical Admiralty Board with an altogether familiar and superficially con-
vincing alternative, that of enhancing the battle fleet itself with Dreadnought-
type battleships. Had the members of the Fisher team had the courage of their
leader’s convictions and gone solely for the battle cruiser, without an “interim”
battleship design, it is interesting to speculate what the competing naval powers
would have done in reply.31 Germany, with its battleships becoming vulnerable
to the planned British submarines and therefore possibly irrelevant for support-
ing any projected invasion of the British Isles and with its global naval infra-
structure unable to support capital ships in distant waters, would have been in a
quandary for sure. Arguably, however, and given what we now know, the worst
case for the British would have seen the Germans rising to the challenge and
competing, hull for hull, but in battle cruisers. The intriguing question, though,
remains: Would this have served them well strategically, as against the British,
and if not, what might they have done about it? While we can never know for sure,
there is an interesting possibility that, with no immediate prospect of resolution of
the foreign-base issue, the Germans might have been more willing to entertain
the sort of naval limitations that were being discussed in the margins of the
Hague Conference of 1907. These speculations aside, the essential point is that
this sort of analysis makes excellent fodder for those contemplating today the
best path for the U.S. Navy. Like the Royal Navy in the Edwardian era, the U.S.
Navy is today’s premier naval power and therefore shares its predecessor’s
unique freedom to make strategic choices that are inconvenient for their rivals.
Moreover, in Fisher’s time there is no doubt that technology’s fickle side
played a role. After all, if these lightly armored “super” cruisers were to prevail in
combat against armored cruisers and older battleships, they would need to de-
liver knockout blows from beyond the reach of their opponents. However, while
they could use their speed advantage to position themselves, the ability to score
hits from long range had been proving elusive, to say the least. Significantly,
however, Fisher believed that once again technology was fast coming up with the
answer. His gunnery background and enthusiasm for the long-range accuracy
problem told him that a true-course calculator being developed by Arthur Pol-
len, the “Argo clock,” was about to provide a revolutionary solution to the prob-
lems of long-range hitting.32 It is important to appreciate that the whole
rationale of a lightly protected ship striking with impunity depended completely
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on this fire-control problem being solved in short order.33 In essence, there could
be no effective battle cruisers without first having an accurate, long-range gun.
Thus Pollen’s invention, or an equivalent, was absolutely vital to Fisher’s plan. As
it happened, through a combination of technical difficulties, delays, and paro-
chial competition, the issue of long-range hitting was not completely solved un-
til the battle cruiser as a warship type had already been deemed questionable at
best.34
In sum, given the patent difficulties surrounding accurate predictions of in-
ternational politics and the likely effects this might have on strategy, not to men-
tion the problems of matching technological expectations with real and tangible
results, arguably the only points a modern strategist can take away are fairly gen-
eral. For example, it is unquestionably a historical fact that armed forces that be-
come overspecialized with respect to a given foe under unique but temporary
strategic circumstances (e.g., the French above) run the risk of being “mar-
ginalized” should those circumstances change. This is simply the result of the
time it takes to procure new tools to fit the new strategic imperatives, as com-
pared to the rapid development of those new imperatives in the first place. This
argues for the retention of a more general, although arguably less efficient, over-
all capability set. Equally, however, there seems to be a strong argument that en-
courages large powers, particularly those in predominant positions, to “force the
pace” by maximizing their innovative capabilities. By pursuing more efficient
strategies, they can push their competitors, who must compete from different
baselines, into even more unfavorable circumstances than their own. At first
glance, these approaches may seem like polar opposites—“damned if you do,
damned if you don’t”—but perhaps they are better looked at as balancing fac-
tors, guidelines that can help but should not be used too prescriptively.
LAZY ASSUMPTIONS, SECRECY, AND THE NEED TO BE A
“LEARNING” INSTITUTION
A second set of difficulties surrounds a somewhat contradictory problem that is
nevertheless inescapably linked to the situation described above. It is the situa-
tion raised when a nation’s strategists make intellectually “lazy” assumptions—
essentially holding that their current strategic thought, doctrine, and tactics will
be perfectly adequate to deal with the new situations, technologies, and circum-
stances they are facing. In other words, they tell themselves that there is nothing
fundamentally different about the emerging situation that might require a fresh
viewpoint or anything radically different to be done militarily. This, of course, is
merely reinforced by the natural bureaucratic inertia of large institutions like
navies. The danger is that strategists might misinterpret or, worse, overlook the
potential advantages being offered by the new technologies and tactics in the
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light of the changing circumstances. In short, they may convince themselves
that the new opportunities offer only incremental or evolutionary improve-
ments to the way in which business has always been conducted when in fact
real alternatives are at hand that could generate disproportionate and asym-
metric advantages. They therefore miss their chance, through a sort of “hege-
monic complacency.”
In this case the Royal Navy, preoccupied with the minutiae of naval technol-
ogy and the prospects for a second Trafalgar, seemed to be very slow as an insti-
tution to recognize that the industrial age had changed the entire notion of naval
warfare forever, with particular implications for a nation with the world’s largest
navy and a global trade dependency. From this point onward, naval decisions
were going to depend less on decisive engagements at sea per se than on how
such engagements might impact the broader and more mundane business of
safeguarding the nation’s economy and generating necessary combat power in
its widest sense. In short, the business of exercising “command of the seas” had
widened considerably. For a country for which naval might underwrote its very
survival as a great power, this was a surprising oversight.
Fisher may have appreciated the need for a radical change, but he certainly
made it no easier for the institution to move in this direction by shrouding his
thoughts in secrecy and forming committees of like-minded individuals to give
his projects the merest fig leaves of objectivity and legitimacy. Disdainful of ex-
plaining himself to anyone, Fisher kept his ideas close to the chest.35 This was
presumably an element of control, so that until the last moment, he might work
in the margins to “engineer” the endorsements he wanted. Whether this prefer-
ence was motivated by concern for security or for more personal gain it is impos-
sible to say. What is clear, however, is that it was unusual, if not unprecedented, in
British naval policy making. It certainly had an adverse effect on public aware-
ness and perception of the naval issues of the day, a consideration that in Great
Britain’s case was significant.36 Inevitably too, it generated resentment and sus-
picion, particularly from Fisher’s peers with other ideas, a tension that was even-
tually to impair his ability to function as an effective leader of the navy.37
One option that might have helped him clarify the various technological, in-
stitutional, and manning pressures would have been a formally constituted na-
val staff. The idea had been mooted for a number of years; Fisher himself had
long talked of such a thing in connection with the development of war plans, go-
ing as far as to propose an additional member of the Admiralty Board who
would be “absolutely dissociated from all administrative and executive work and
solely concerned in the preparation of the Fleet for War.”38 It was fast becoming
clear that, with the increasing administrative burden of training and equipping
an industrial-age navy, the First Sea Lord’s traditional responsibility for both
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those matters and the fleet’s war plans and readiness was simply too much for a
single man, no matter how capable. However, Fisher, once established as the
First Sea Lord, was not at all helpful in the establishment of a “War Plans Divi-
sion” at the Admiralty; in fact, he is on record as opposing such a move.39 The
reasons for this change of heart are unclear, although it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that it had at least something to do with the inevitable loss of author-
ity for the titular “head of the navy.” Instead, Fisher persevered with his unoffi-
cial committees, which, though easing the physical burdens involved, did
nothing to foster a corporate sense of shared responsibility as an official staff
would have done. Worse, they failed to “institutionalize” or guarantee the devel-
opment of strategic thought when the First Sea Lord was otherwise occupied.
In this light, and despite his early support for a naval war college, he never
took advantage of the assistance that might have been possible from this body,
nor did he seem interested in its teaching or developing naval strategy for his
later consideration.40 Instead, he seemed satisfied with infrequent correspon-
dence with members of the faculty who shared his viewpoint, as a way of gaining
their endorsements. The net result was that there was little or no connection
between the bright young minds in the service and the business of developing na-
val strategy per se. In fact, the crucial value of informed strategic debate was not
inculcated in the navy as a whole, and its absence continued to elicit little com-
ment. Put another way, the Edwardian Royal Navy was not a “learning institution”
—one in which the input of ideas high and low on the command chain is both
encouraged and expected, and one where the appropriate mechanisms are
firmly in place to ensure the widest possible dissemination. This was a critical
shortcoming that, when coupled with Fisher’s penchant for secrecy and “behind
the scenes” activity, did not serve the institution well when it was trying to make
sense of changes of such magnitude and complexity.
In the end, these failings became self-fulfilling prophecies. At the crucial
juncture, when the battle-cruiser strategy needed its fullest possible explanation
and support, Fisher was fatally distracted by chronic and increasingly virulent
disagreements with his senior admiral afloat, Lord Charles Beresford. Although
brought to a head over the issue of war plans, the disagreements went far deeper
and centered on an increasing resentment by senior officers of the overbearing
and imperious way in which the office of the First Sea Lord could drive through
a program of reform without a healthy and active debate in service circles.41 For
the battle-cruiser idea, this turbulence was fatal, as there was no one else to carry
the torch. Similarly, and because the rationale of the new industrial-age mission
of commerce protection had not been debated widely, the logic of Britain “forc-
ing the pace” in this direction, on the grounds that Britain would benefit more
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than its competitors, was lost on the wider naval establishment. As a result, the
fact that the difficulties suffered by the French and Russians had only created a
temporary, not a lasting, interlude was not appreciated. In short Britain, follow-
ing an outdated imperative, missed the opportunity to take a huge initiative in
naval strategy, one that it was uniquely placed to capitalize upon.
Finally and before concluding, mention has to be made of a seemingly valid
counterpoint to all of this—the simple fact that despite not having responded in
a particularly innovative fashion to the technological promises of the age, Great
Britain surely won the naval arms race and successfully headed off the threat
from imperial Germany. In fact, it can also be argued that had the reformers ac-
tually been more successful and the Admiralty managed to divert more money
toward submarines in particular, the net result might have been—given the ar-
guably exaggerated estimates of the capabilities of submarines for sea denial at
the time—more and not less vulnerability to concentrated naval pressure in
home waters. While it is almost impossible to predict accurately the outcome of
the submarine contest that might have resulted, the two happy outcomes men-
tioned above owe more to the strategic limitations imposed on Germany by its
“risk fleet” strategy than they ever did to any British activity. Great Britain was
indeed lucky that its opponent turned out to be, if anything, even less prone to
accept naval strategic innovation beyond the battleship than Britain was. Had
this not been the case, and had it faced a set of strategists as globally aware and
agile as those in some quarters of the French navy, events might have turned out
quite differently. In other words, Britain’s success in the First World War oc-
curred in spite of, and not because of, the quality of its naval thought.
WHAT CAN THE U.S. NAVY LEARN FROM THIS CASE?
To achieve maximum impact in a complex and multifaceted subject, the four
main recommendations that have been discussed above are restated in a deliber-
ately simplified way, paired for convenience, and rendered in a rather unconven-
tional “bullet” form.
Avoid “Lazy” Assumptions; Become a “Learning Institution”
Although a lot of historians have criticized the Edwardian Royal Navy for a
“paucity of professional thinking,” this charge rather misses the mark.42 As ide-
ally this article has shown, there seemed to be no shortage of the right ideas
around, but somehow the authors of those ideas, Fisher included, were simply
unable to convince the institution of the need for a fundamental shake-up in na-
val thinking. As a result, the navy as a whole did not see itself in a new light—as
performing different types of missions to effect the same ends. Looked at an-
other way, it was not a “learning institution,” capable of the necessary analysis
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and discussion to support the large leaps of faith needed to confront the new age.
In fact, the key point of the late Victorian engineering revolution—namely, the
hugely increased mobility of large steamships—was almost completely missed by
the Admiralty. The result was a disappointing and expensive merger of the new ca-
pabilities into the existing, obsolete service rationale, a compromise that ulti-
mately left the nation poorly placed to regain the initiative a few decades later.
This is a lesson that the U.S. Navy simply has to grasp. As the British case
proves, once an institutional failure of this sort takes place, it is almost impossi-
ble to recover. This is because the long timeline needed for the development of
the new capabilities, coupled with the massive expenditures required, set against
a finite, and often declining, defense budget, effectively poses a “one shot”decision
—sink or swim! When the merits or otherwise of your first move finally become
clear, the parameters will have moved on still farther—and you will be either on
the “power curve” or hopelessly behind it. If you are behind, the only future
seems to be a loss of primacy and ultimately of strategic relevance, which is ef-
fectively what happened to the Royal Navy after the First World War. In this light,
the nation that maintains a healthy amount of both technological and doctrinal
innovation in all mission areas is most likely to be best poised to reap the even-
tual benefits.
As for Technology, Innovate—but Don’t Overspecialize
The U.S. Navy of the twenty-first century obviously needs to nurture and de-
velop a more questioning professional service culture. The key is widespread
and thorough professional education right across the strata of decision makers,
such that a culture of risk taking and evaluation at all levels is encouraged. This
is not to say that the Navy should throw money at a whole range of increasingly
outlandish projects in the hope that “something sticks”—far from it! It should,
however, critically and continuously assess the potential scope of each advance
and how it might affect America’s position, doing “just enough” research to keep
the country consistently better placed than others to make a hard move when ei-
ther the technology matures or changing circumstances demand.
Perhaps the most important point for the U.S. Navy to grasp is the strategic
freedoms conferred by its position as the premier sea power. As the possessor of
the world’s largest navy, the United States is in a uniquely advantageous posi-
tion; its sheer size and the natural inertia within the system will continue to
shield it while it makes these transitions, something that is simply not true for
any other nation. For its competitors, by contrast, a rapid achievement of sys-
tems parity with the U.S. Navy (or a key superiority, in some specific area—for
example, antiship missiles) is the goal, and any research that might threaten this
is automatically shunned. This makes these nations innately less able to respond
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to change, no matter how innovative they may appear on the surface—because
they are constrained by an overriding pressure that is simply absent from the
American considerations.
The British were halfway there, in that they were innovating, but their poorly
educated and parochial officer corps was simply incapable of collectively mak-
ing the necessary switch in thinking from the battle line to global power projec-
tion as the key naval mission area. The U.S. Navy cannot afford to fall into the
same trap, basically assuming that its sheer size—for all its benefits that we have
noted—somehow confers an exclusive and inherent “right” to the rather differ-
ent type of sea control outlined in CS-21.
Finally, and inexorably linked to the above, there is the question of how to ap-
proach emerging technology. This article has highlighted the difficulties of rely-
ing on radical and unproven advances during periods of strategic uncertainty.
However, beyond the purely mechanical difficulties of predicting when given
technologies will mature, there is the broader issue of the sorts of questions the
strategist should be exploring. There has been a tendency in the past few decades
to develop mission sets that make the best use of available equipment, rather
than seeking technological solutions that best address the widest range of possi-
ble strategic outcomes. Put another way, in our eagerness to find answers to “to-
day’s problems” and incorporate new technologies, it is possible to become too
fixated on a specific mission set, against a particular foe—and then be essentially
outmaneuvered by a shift in the broader strategic environment. We would then
find our military optimized for operational and strategic circumstances that are
no longer very pertinent to national interests. This is the classic “being overly
prepared to fight the last war,” or the war that you want to fight, as has been seen
time and time again in history. To a certain extent this is an inevitable conse-
quence of the human learning process, one that is unlikely to be entirely elimi-
nated, but we nonetheless need to be on our guard, particularly when opinions
become excessively polarized as a part of the surrounding political debate.
In the end, though, the case we have examined was not simply another in-
stance of good intentions let down by technology. It is a salutary warning of the
powerful and often unforeseen impacts that a combination of human elements,
changing strategic imperatives, and the characteristically erratic and risky
promises of technology can have upon even a well structured and mature strate-
gic plan. Such institutional and bureaucratic considerations are of crucial im-
portance; they can collectively undermine even the best “classical” strategic
ideas, just as surely as can the passage of time. After all, Fisher was, in the words
of Marder, “an extraordinary man, not to be judged by normal standards.”43 A
gifted administrator, blessed with immense moral courage and an insatiable
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energy and drive, even he was diverted from his well considered strategic quest
by this insidious combination. How much more vulnerable are we likely to be
ourselves! For these reasons, therefore, we must take time to analyze such mo-
ments from history lest we be destined to repeat their mistakes in our own time.
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package be implemented “en bloc,” see Fisher
Papers, vol. 1, pp. 16–21, which includes the
“The Scheme! The Whole Scheme!! And Noth-
ing but the Scheme!!!” exhortation. Time and
space do not permit a detailed description of
all the aspects of his reforms, but for the un-
initiated, the main points can be summarized
as follows: officer training and entry schemes
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to be consolidated so as to produce modern,
technically proficient thinkers; old, obsolete
ships to be scrapped en masse, thereby reduc-
ing operating costs and releasing manpower
(for new ships) and jetty space/facilities; the
naval reserve to be reconstituted as “nucleus
crews” (two-fifths of complement) for the
continuous manning of modern ships cycling
through reserve status, thereby improving
fleet readiness; the current, home defense
(anti-invasion) alignment of the battle fleet
to be replaced by using submarines and flo-
tilla craft for home defense, thus freeing up
the capital ships for global trade protection;
and new classes of battle cruisers to be devel-
oped to form these “flying squadrons” sta-
tioned at Britain’s key points of interest
around the world, ready to surge naval power
wherever it was needed—for which great
speed, hitting power, and endurance were re-
quired. Finally, these squadrons were to be
controlled by a revolutionary new wireless
link, “the war room system,” to the planners
in Whitehall. The term “battle cruiser” used
in this article actually comes from a later
point in the story, when it was recognized
that these vessels would have to serve in the
battle line. In this time frame they were more
correctly termed “armored cruisers,” but in
order to distinguish them from these earlier
ships, which were still being built at the time,
the author has used the terms “battle” or
“super” cruiser.
11. Some of the resistance that was to be offered
to these vessels was apparent even before the
first were completed. In Brassey’s Naval An-
nual for 1907, for example, the editor was of
the opinion that the Invincible class, having
the armament of a battleship, would never be
released for cruiser duties: “any admiral hav-
ing Invincibles in his fleet will be certain to
put them in the line of battle,” even though
their lack of protection would make them
vulnerable. On this basis alone, he recom-
mended that the type not be repeated. See
Thomas Brassey, ed., Naval Annual
(Portsmouth, U.K.: J. Griffin, 1907), p. 9.
12. For a discussion as to why Fisher ended up
devoting a lot of energy to promoting HMS
Dreadnought, arguably at the expense of his
battle cruiser, see the author’s recent article
“HMS Dreadnought (1906): A Naval Revolu-
tion Misinterpreted or Mishandled?”
Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord 20, no. 2
(April 2010), pp. 175–98. This is a compli-
cated story, but in essence the article argues
that Dreadnought was pushed as an interim
type because it made more sense at the time
to get the technology (turbine propulsion
and all big guns) to sea quickly rather than
wait for the longer build time of the Invinci-
bles. Given the overall resistance to the battle
cruiser idea, it was simply not possible to get
the Admiralty solidly behind the type in time
to make a difference.
13. Marder’s classic work on the Fisher era is his
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The
Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, 5
vols. (London and New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1961–70). The majority of his observa-
tions on Fisher can be found in the first vol-
ume, The Road to War.
14. In a letter to Arthur Balfour, the British
prime minister, Fisher explains the sea-denial
potential of submarines in shallow seas: “In
the course of a few years [it was then 1904]
no Fleet will be able to remain in the Medi-
terranean or the English Channel! But at the
same time submarines at Malta, Gibraltar,
Port Said, Alexandria, Suez and Lemnos will
make us more powerful than ever.” FGDN,
vol. 1, p. 294. Other letters with similar senti-
ments appear on pp. 253, 305–10.
15. Much has been made by some scholars as to
the considerable exaggeration of the capabili-
ties of both torpedoes and their delivery plat-
forms during this period, but this concern is
irrelevant to the arguments being advanced
here. The point is that Fisher, as a torpedo
enthusiast, supposed that these weapons
would very soon have these capabilities, if
they did not already. It therefore made emi-
nent sense that he would take these likeli-
hoods into account in both his strategic and
materiel reasoning. In point of fact Jon
Sumida quotes the ranges for torpedoes
(eighteen-inch) at five thousand yards in
1906 and double that by 1908; see his “A
Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the
Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912–1916,” Jour-
nal of Military History 67, no. 1 (January
2003), p. 88.
16. Perhaps the best contemporary explanation
of Fisher’s thinking on speed and gun power
in large ships is found in a lecture by Julian
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Corbett to the Royal United Service Institu-
tion that was published in July 1907 (see
RUSI Journal 51, part 2 [July–December
1907], pp. 824–33). This lecture was insti-
gated by Fisher himself, in response to criti-
cisms being received from both within the
Admiralty and outside. Another good con-
temporary discussion on the pros and cons of
high speed in capital ships can be found in
Brassey’s Naval Annual for 1906, pp. 144–55.
17. Jon T. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Suprem-
acy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval
Policy, 1889–1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman,
1989), esp. chap. 1, pp. 3–35.
18. Quoted in ibid., p. 26. Lord Selborne was the
civilian First Lord of the Admiralty when
Fisher was appointed to Whitehall in October
1904 as the senior Naval Lord. The relation-
ship was somewhat akin to that between, in
today’s U.S. Navy, CNO and the Secretary of
the Navy—although, if anything, Selborne
was closer to being the Secretary of Defense,
on account of the huge predominance of the
Royal Navy in the defense of Great Britain at
that time.
19. Lambert first expounds his theories in a pair
of articles written in 1995. The most impor-
tant to our discussion is “Admiral Sir John
Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence,”
Journal of Military History 59 (October 1995),
pp. 639–60. His whole plan is revealed in a
later book-length monograph, Sir John
Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: Univ. of
South Carolina Press, 1999), esp. chap. 3.
20. Fisher is extremely disparaging about the
smaller, obsolescent cruiser types that were
traditionally used in their twilight years to
perform useful services in the policing of the
distant empire. Calling them the “snail” and
“tortoise” classes, he points out the waste of
resources incurred by maintaining them and
of manpower in manning them (crews that
needed to be trained to fight) and the fact
that were they to be challenged by armored
cruisers—an eventuality becoming very real
with the “suddenness” of modern naval
war—they would be eaten up as armadillos
eat up ants! See “Naval Necessities” (written
1903), in Fisher Papers, vol. 1, p. 30.
21. See “Naval Necessities,” app. H, “The Strate-
gic Distribution of the Fleet,” a paper
circulated to the Admiralty Board in Novem-
ber 1904 and reproduced in Fisher Papers,
vol. 1, p. 161. The “five keys” were Singapore,
the Cape of Good Hope, Alexandria, Gibral-
tar, and Dover. These were “imperial for-
tresses” (as originally described by John
Colomb) and possessed the necessary dock-
yards and coal, not to mention protection, to
make basing a fleet there a viable proposition.
Possessions like these were almost unique to
Britain at the time.
22. For a thorough description of the strategic
rationale behind the submarine and battle-
cruiser combination see Jon Sumida, “Geog-
raphy, Technology, and British Naval Strat-
egy in the Dreadnought Era,” Naval War
College Review 59, no. 3 (Summer 2006), pp.
89–102.
23. In the later stages of his first monograph,
Lambert demonstrates that in the eleventh
hour before the First World War (January
1914), Winston Churchill, the cabinet, and
the Admiralty worked out a possible “deal”
that would largely substitute submarines for
at least two of the battleships ordered in the
1914 naval estimates. Some historians main-
tain that this episode demonstrates that
Fisher was actually successful in changing
Royal Navy strategy. But it was “too little, too
late.” The dreadnought race had already run
its course, and the High Seas Fleet and the
soon-to-be-renamed Grand Fleet were locked
in a strategic “face-off” that had effectively
paralyzed innovative strategic thinking on ei-
ther side. See Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval
Revolution, pp. 295–300.
24. An exception here would be Charles Fair-
banks, Jr., who makes this very point. See his
“The Origins of the Dreadnought Revolution:
A Historiographical Essay,” International His-
tory Review 13, no. 2 (May 1991), pp. 246–72,
esp. p. 247.
25. Erik Dahl’s “Net-centric before Its Time: The
Jeune École and Its Lessons for Today,” Na-
val War College Review 58, no. 4 (Autumn
2005), pp. 109–35. The words jeune école
mean, literally, “young school.” This was a
group of reform-minded, midgrade officers
in France, who, under the leadership and tu-
telage of Adm. Théophile Aube, were angry at
the complacency and inactivity in the naval
leadership and anxious to implement reforms
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emphasizing merit over birthright. This
group also looked to restore France’s mari-
time pride by challenging Great Britain. Their
methodology was to target areas where Brit-
ain was weak, specifically focusing on tor-
pedo attacks to weaken the blockading battle
line and on commerce raiding against Brit-
ain’s huge merchant fleet. Central to their
concept was decentralization, whereby youn-
ger officers, in command of smaller and more
lethal ships, were to have more say in the di-
rection that the navy took. In strategic terms,
their concentration on the secondary effects
of a collapse in the shipping-insurance mar-
ket was masterful. With Great Britain carry-
ing considerably more than 50 percent of the
whole world’s sea trade, it stood to reason
that its economic interests would suffer dis-
proportionately high penalties from any loss
of confidence in the ocean-trading market.
26. Ibid., pp. 122–25. Although Dahl does not
recognize that it was primarily the shifting of
focus from Great Britain to Germany, in
terms of the likely naval opposition, that re-
ally doomed the Jeune École rationale, he
does explain that the school ultimately failed
in its quest to restore the French navy to
prominence.
27. The armored cruisers of the Russian Rurik
and French Jeanne d’Arc classes were typical,
and had the nations worked in conjunction,
squadrons of these ships in the Pacific, Medi-
terranean, and Atlantic would have posed a
credible threat, at least insofar as their capa-
bilities were understood by the British Admi-
ralty. For a good summation of this threat,
see Theodore Ropp, The Development of a
Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 1871–
1904 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1987), pp. 240–53, 284–98.
28. Alfred von Tirpitz, the incoming naval minis-
ter, in a memorandum to the kaiser dated 15
June 1897 and entitled “General Consider-
ations on the Constitution of Our Fleet ac-
cording to Ship Classes and Designs,” had
expressly ruled out commerce raiding as a
suitable strategy against the British. He
termed it “hopeless, because of the shortage
of bases on our side.” See Jonathan Steinberg,
Yesterday’s Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of
the German Battle Fleet (London: Macdonald,
1965, and New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp.
208–23.
29. For a historian with this opinion, see John
Brooks, “Dreadnought: Blunder, or Stroke of
Genius?” War in History 14, no. 2 (April
2007), pp. 157–78. Brooks makes the point
that in the strategic context of 1905, evolu-
tionary designs for the battleships and cruis-
ers of the 1905–1906 estimates would have
made more sense, and he speculates, with the
benefit of hindsight, that they might have de-
layed and reduced the intensity of the dread-
nought race between Britain and Germany.
30. See, for example, an article by William H.
White (a previous director of naval construc-
tion and the designer of the Royal Sovereign
class of battleships, which had set the pattern
for the genre prior to the advent of Dread-
nought), “Admiralty Policy and the New Na-
val Estimates,” Nineteenth Century 59 (April
1906), pp. 601–18. On page 613 he makes the
point that with cordial relations with France
and the United States and with Russia in the
doldrums, the present was not the time to
force the pace: “Our unrivaled shipbuilding
powers enable us to pause and judge the situ-
ation, because even starting at a later time
than the others, Britain can still build a useful
superiority faster than anyone else.”
31. There is evidence in Fisher’s correspondence
that although he always personally believed
that the leap to the battle cruiser could be
made without an interim stage, he was finally
in a minority of one in his Committee on
Ship Design in the fall of 1904. See a letter
written to the journalist Arnold White in
1908, in FGDN, vol. 2, pp. 188–89. Some ear-
lier references from Lord Selborne, minuted
on his copy of Fisher’s “Naval Necessities,”
and intended for Fisher, may also have been
relevant here; words to the effect that “the
Japanese don’t seem to agree with you about
battleships [their demise]” may have cau-
tioned him. Fisher Papers, vol. 1, p. 41.
32. The crucial point is that Fisher was surely
aware of these advances before he made his
dreadnought decisions in 1905. Looking back
through his correspondence, although the
earliest mention of it comes from 1906, it is
clear that the Admiralty had been interested
in the device since 1904 and was largely satis-
fied with the inventor’s claims. John Jellicoe,
a Fisher protégé and fellow gunnery officer,
had been instrumental in promoting Pollen’s
equipment; it is therefore inconceivable that
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Fisher had not been kept informed of prog-
ress. See Fisher’s letter to the new First Lord,
Lord Tweedmouth, recommending that the
apparatus receive national patent protection,
in FGDN, vol. 2, p. 87.
33. For a thorough description of the Pollen ap-
paratus, see Jon T. Sumida, “British Capital
Ship Design and Fire Control in the Dread-
nought Era: Sir John Fisher, Arthur Hunger-
ford Pollen, and the Battlecruiser,” Journal of
Modern History 51, no. 2 (June 1979), pp.
212–17. See also John Brooks, “All Big Guns:
Fire Control and Capital Ship Design,” War
Studies Journal 1 (1996), pp. 36–52. Sumida’s
summation has largely been corroborated in
the more recent Norman Friedman, Naval
Firepower: Battleship Guns and Gunnery in the
Dreadnought Era (Annapolis, Md.: Naval In-
stitute Press, 2008).
34. For an explanation that supports the prag-
matic conclusion that the Fisher team was
right to proceed with the battle cruiser on the
basis that “no insuperable difficulties could
exist in the solving of the long range fire con-
trol problem” see Brooks, “All Big Guns,” pp.
36–52. For an explanation that takes issue
with this, as well as with numerous other
technological points, while explaining the
“Dreyer table” controversy, see a review essay
by Jon Sumida, “Gunnery, Procurement, and
Strategy in the Dreadnought Era,” Journal of
Military History 69, no. 4 (October 2005), pp.
1179–87. These two papers represent the cur-
rent positions on either side of the unre-
solved interpretation of the fire control story.
35. See for example his famous quote in a letter
to Arnold White. “The one great rule in life is
NEVER EXPLAIN! Your Friends don’t want
an explanation. They believe in you. The
friends who want an explanation ain’t fit to be
friends. Your enemies won’t believe any expla-
nation! I never in all my life have ever yet ex-
plained, and don’t mean to!” FGDN, vol. 2,
pp. 388–89.
36. In this light, it is important to appreciate that
British naval policy in this period was a sub-
ject of intense interest to the professional
classes. Leaders (editorials) in newspapers,
debates in both houses of Parliament, and
columns in society magazines were regularly
devoted to the “naval issues” that were per-
plexing amateur and professional alike. It is
also fair to say that the Admiralty took note
of (and used) these avenues regularly—par-
ticularly under Sir John Fisher.
37. See in particular an anonymous article, “A
Retrograde Admiralty,” Blackwood’s Edin-
burgh Magazine 177 (May 1905), pp. 597–
607. It was widely attributed to Rear Admiral
Sir Reginald Custance, lately the Director of
Naval Intelligence, who was extremely critical
of Fisher’s methods. Custance criticizes
Fisher for deliberately undermining the au-
thority of the other Admiralty Board mem-
bers, in particular the Controller of the Navy,
a junior member but the one charged with
the material health of the fleet. He was there-
fore effectively turning the board into a per-
sonal dictatorship. He also offers contrary
opinions on each and every one of Fisher’s
main reforms. There is evidence that the arti-
cle particularly incensed Fisher. Similar senti-
ments are also seen in the well researched
article by William White, “Admiralty Policy
and the New Naval Estimates,” cited above.
White condemns the secrecy surrounding
Dreadnought as dangerous and indeed super-
fluous to military security, summing up, “A
policy withdrawn from discussion and criti-
cism is not likely to be the best.”
38. For a perceptive look at the whole issue of a
naval war staff and Fisher’s schizophrenic be-
havior in this regard, see Paul Haggie, “The
Royal Navy and War Planning in the Fisher
Era,” Journal of Contemporary History 8, no. 3
(July 1973), pp. 113–31, esp. p. 115, and
FGDN, vol. 1, p. 232.
39. Haggie, “Royal Navy and War Planning in
the Fisher Era,” p. 116.
40. Ibid., p. 130.
41. The anonymous “A Retrograde Admiralty,”
cited above, was typical.
42. Bryan Ranft, in “The Protection of British
Seaborne Trade and the Development of a
Systematic Planning for War, 1860–1906,”
accuses the late-Victorian Admiralty of an
“alarming poverty of thought.” See Bryan
Ranft, ed., Technical Change and British Na-
val Policy, 1860–1939 (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1977), pp. 3–4. This has been a
popular sentiment with historians in the
wake of the First World War, and while much
can be attributed to a revulsion, natural at the
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time, for all things military, it should also be
remembered that a part of the specific remit
of the First Lord was to review, comment
upon, and explain the professional merits or
otherwise of the various plans and strategies
of his service.
43. FGDN, vol. 1, p. 12.
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